CONCURRENT



Back to the Future

Back to the Future?




Michael J. Fox as Marty McFly on a hoverboard in 2015 in Back To The Future Part II (1989), screen shot, January 1, 2015. (http://youtube.com). URL: https://donaldearlcollins.com/2015/01/01/back-to-my-future-forward-to-the-past/



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An Example – one of our new VME boards



Future

PMC support
 Backwards compatible rear
 I/O

VME32 handles and 3-row P2 connector

Legacy

WEbus interface

6-core Intel[®] Xeon[®] Processor
UEFI BIOS only
NVMe M.2 storage
Enhanced Security

I have to run the same application code we developed x years ago
I can't change the Operating System (or version)
I want to retain the option to change supplier
I need the latest security features
My program runs for another y years

Not easy - but that's what we're good at


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Intel x86 processors are backwards compatible
They can run any code developed for older processors
For security and scalability there are now some restrictions

UEFI BIOS

Many Intel processors now only support UEFI Class 3 BIOS (all by 2020)

- Improves security
- But there is no 16-bit legacy BIOS via a Compatibility Support Module (CSM)



www.uefi.org

It is not possible to natively boot a legacy Operating System including:

- Windows 7
- Any 32-bit OS like VxWorks 6.x, Linux 32-bit etc

One solution ETT 2019 **m**ware[®] Boot using a bare metal or hosted hypervisor PARTNER **128** Run the legacy OS and application in a Virtual Machine **STANDARD** TECHNOLOGY Has an small impact on real time performance ALLIANCE VM Legacy OS & VxWorks 6.x Application Windows NT



Hypervisor

Windows XP

VMware ESXi


Lynx Secure Hypervisor

Hyper-V

VP B7x/msd Example

Many interfaces support Single Root I/O Virtualization (SR-IOV)


- > One physical device appears as multiple separate physical devices
- Each VM has the ability to access the interface




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Some devices like the VMEbus interface chip are not SR-IOV capable

- 11 works in Direct Path I/O mode
 - Limits one Virtual Machine to access the VMEbus interface directly




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Each level can be measured

The hashes are recorded in a TPM for remote attestation

Secure Boot only loads a trusted (signed) operating system bootloader





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End to end Security is needed





Any break in this chain is a potential risk



- We now sign our firmware using a private key
- 22 During the manufacturing process, the board is 'fused' to the public key
- 22 Any attempt to boot using non-authorized firmware will fail:
 - Verified and Measured profiles implemented with Immediate Shutdown
- Maintenance updates can be done:
 - > We provide a new firmware image to the customer signed with the private key

Ensures the firmware has not been tampered with:

- Between leaving our factory and arriving at a customer's site
- During the life-cycle of the product

Solution Continue the balancing act

Mart of our moral and ethical duty as COTS suppliers in this space





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Thanks for listening